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Whitfield v. Nev. State Pers. Comm’n, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 34 (July 29, 2021)1 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: NAMING ALL RESPONDENTS  
Summary 
NRS 233B.130(2)(a)’s plain meaning requires strict compliance of naming all respondents 
in the caption of a petition for judicial review.2 In the present case, Michael Whitfield filed a 
petition for judicial review, which the district court dismissed per Otto for failing to name all 
respondents in the caption.3 Whitfield appealed the decision citing Prevost, stating that failure to 
name each respondent did not automatically fail the requirements of NRS 233B.130(2)(a).4 The 
Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the decision of the district court and overruled Prevost.5 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Michael Whitfield, an employee with the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) was 
required by NDOC to both carry a firearm and maintain Peace Officer Standards and Training 
(POST) certification, which required biannual firearm qualifications. In August 2017, Whitfield 
got a domestic violence restraining order against him, which made it illegal for Whitfield to have 
a firearm (for a three-year period), including for NDOC. NDOC gave Whitfield five months to 
resolve the issue and get back his ability to carry a firearm. Whitfield did not get the order removed 
nor modified and was thus dismissed from his job for failing the POST requirement. Whitfield 
timely filed a petition for judicial review and correctly served both the petition and summons, but 
did not name any respondents in either the caption or body of the petition. NDOC moved to 
dismiss, arguing NDOC, the Commission, the hearing officer and the Nevada Department of 
 
1  Nazo Demirdjian.  
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(a) (2015). 
3  Washoe Cnty. v. Otto, 128 Nev. 424, 282 P.3d 719 (2012).  
4  Prevost v. State, Dep’t of Admin., 134 Nev. 326, 418 P.3d 675 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(a) (2015). 
5  Prevost, 134 Nev. at 328, 418 P.3d at 676-77.  
Administration were not named and that the 30-day petition window had passed. Whitfield filed 
an amended petition four days later naming the respondents NDOC had mentioned and cited 
Prevost in stating failure to name a respondent did not mean the Court loses subject matter 
jurisdiction.6 Additionally, Whitfield argued the amendment met NCRP 15, making NDOC’s 
motion a moot point.7 The District Court granted NDOC’s motion to dismiss holding that NRS 
233B.130 was not satisfied since no respondent was named and the amended petition had failed 
the 30-Day window set up under NRS 233B.130(2)(d).8 
DISCUSSION 
Where legislation provides for judicial review by statute, courts have appellate jurisdiction 
over administrative agencies’ acts.9 In this instance, Nevada’s Administrative Productive Act  
(APA) controls judicial review for administrative decision. Otto held NRS 233B.130’s plain 
language demanded strict compliance.10 While the Court acknowledged stare decisis in Prevost, it 
likewise cited Lloyd in ruling impractical decisions should not stand simply because of stare 
decision.11 Thus, the Court overruled Prevost.12  
NRS 233B.130(2)(a) required every part of the record to be named as a respondent in the 
petition 
Whitfield argued that his petition met all the requirements set out in NRS 233B.130(2)(a) and 
Prevost since all parties were named in the petition’s body.13 The Court responded by citing Otto, 
and stating that only a legislative act can create jurisdiction if an administrative agency has 
 
6  Id.   
7  Nev. R. Civ. P. 15.  
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(d) (2015). 
9  Washoe Cnty. v. Otto, 128 Nev. 424, 431, 282 P.3d 719, 724 (2012). 
10  Id.  
11  State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. 739, 750, 312 P.3d 467, 474 (2013) 
12  Prevost v. State, Dep’t of Admin., 134 Nev. 326, 328, 418 P.3d 675, 676-77 (2018). 
13  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(d) (2015); Id.  
 
appellate jurisdiction.14 Any failure of statutory requirements means courts have no jurisdiction. 
Otto required strict compliance.15 The Court also entertained Whitfield’s argument per Prevost, 
but then stated that the decision was wrong and overturned it for being “unworkable.”16 
Because Whitfield failed to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction, he could not amend his 
petition.  
Whitfield argued that NRS 233B.130(2)(d) related to a window to file—not to amend—a 
petition. Without an amendment window, NRCP 15 timing requirements allowed him to amend.17 
However, the Court argued that NRS 233.130(2)(d)’s deadline is a moot point when district court’s 
jurisdiction was not invoked, such as here where Whitfield failed to name the respondents.18 
Additionally, the Court held that under NRCP 81(a), the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure did not 
apply when in conflict with the APA—as is the case here.19 Finally, the Court determined that 
NRS 233B.130(2)(d) lacking express language allowing an extension of time meant no such time 
is allowed.20 Otherwise, it would have been explicitly expressed.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s granting of NDOC’s motion to 
dismiss. The Court found that NRS 223B.130(2)(a)’s language was clear in requiring all 
respondents be named in the caption of a petition for judicial review, reaffirming Otto and 
overruling Prevost.21 
 
14  Otto, 128 Nev. at 431, 282 P.3d at 724. 
15  Id. 
16  Prevost v. State, Dep’t of Admin., 134 Nev. 326, 418 P.3d 676-77 (2018). 
17  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(d) (2015); Nev. R. Civ. P. 15.  
18  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(d) (2015). 
19  Nev. R. Civ. P. 81(a).  
20  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(d) (2015); Cf. Bopp v. Lino, 110 Nev, 1246, 1252, 885 P.2d 559, 563 (1994) 
(applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of 
another—when interpreting a statute). 
21  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(d) (2015); Washoe Cnty. v. Otto, 128 Nev. 424, 282 P.3d 719 (2012); Prevost v. 
State, Dep’t of Admin., 134 Nev. 326, 418 P.3d 676-77 (2018). 
DISSENT 
 Judge Pickering dissented, with Judge Parraguirre concurring with the dissent. Judge 
Pickering argued that Whitfield’s petition named his employer and the agency that reviewed his 
termination, thus satisfying the statute. Judge Pickering uses the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary to synonymize “name as” with “identify,” and Black’s Law Dictionary to define 
“respondent” and show that Whitfield identified the respondents—which is what NRS 
233B.130(2)(a) requires.22 Judge Pickering further argued that the majority’s explanation that the 
statute requires naming respondents in the caption is against the plain language, which the majority 
brings up to justify their holding. Likewise, he argued that overruling Prevost would defeat the 
plain language of the statute which the dissent reproduces.23 
 Next, Judge Pickering said that a harsh requirement of naming respondents in the caption—
meaning the term “respondent” should appear next to the respondents—created a pitfall for 
laypersons. Citing Cooksey, Judge Pickering contended that the intent of the wording is more 
important, meaning the use of the “word” respondent is not as important as the intent of naming 
said respondents.24 Additionally, Judge Pickering said the majority erred in failing to respect stare 
decisis and thus upholding Prevost.25 He disagreed that Otto (the case the majority references) and 
Prevost (the case the majority overrules) were at odds because Otto fully failed to name 
respondents whereas Prevost only did so in the body.26 Otto failed the statute in either way, 
whereas Prevost failed if the caption requirement was enforced.27 
 
22  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2)(a) (2015). 
23  Prevost, 134 Nev. at 328, 418 P.3d at 676-77. 
24  Cooksey v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 831 N.W.2d 94, 104 (Iowa 2013).  
25  Prevost, 134 Nev. at 328, 418 P.3d at 676-77. 
26  Id.; Washoe Cnty. v. Otto, 128 Nev. 424, 282 P.3d 719 (2012).  
27  Prevost, 134 Nev. at 328, 418 P.3d at 676-77; Otto, 128 Nev. at 434, 282 P.3d at 726 (2012).  
 Finally, the dissent cited several cases to demonstrate that the majority opinion makes 
Nevada unique in terms of APAs.28 
 
28  See Hopper v. Indus. Comm’n, 558 P.2d 927, 932 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); D.C. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. V. Int’l 
Bhd. Of Police Officers, Local 445, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 680 A.2d 434, 438 (D.C. 1996); Cooksey 
831 N.W.2d at 104 (Iowa 2013); Associated Grocers Co. of St. Louis, Mo. v. Crowe, 389 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1965); Skagit Surveyors & Eng’rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit Cty., 958 P.2d 962, 969 (Wash. 1998); Fisher v. 
Mayfield, 505 N.E.2d 975, 976 (Ohio 1987).  
 
 
